Turning the Page on US Foreign Policy

The Middle East

Justin Raimondo
One would think that the title of my talk – "The Middle East: Turning the Page on U.S. Foreign Policy" – is fairly noncontroversial, as such things go. Yet the very idea of turning the page – that is, of making a significant change – in our policy in the region is considered heresy, and not only in foreign policy circles but in Washington, D.C., generally. The reason is because our Middle Eastern policy has become hopelessly politicized, locked into a formulaic and increasingly unrealistic stance highly detrimental to our national interest yet artificially maintained by one of the most powerful lobbies in Washington.

Before we turn the page on U.S. policy in the Middle East, we must turn the page on the Israel lobby – the single most decisive factor in shaping our actions and pronouncements in that part of the world.

That the Middle East is a touchy subject is a contention few would dispute. The touchiness, however, only extends in one direction. One has only to utter a single word critical of Israel, and immediately a whole chorus of voices rise up, in unison, speaking in terms meant to end, rather than begin, the discussion. A battery of activist organizations, watchdog groups, and lobbying groups in the guise of "think tanks" springs into action, as if on cue, and the heretic is silenced.

This kind of thing has been going on for years. However, the publication of The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, by John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, last year was the occasion for such a firestorm of vituperation that one would have thought its attackers were referring to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, or some tract by David Duke. Indeed, both were invoked in all too many of the jeremiads unleashed at the authors of The Israel Lobby. In newspaper columns, editorials, and the book review sections of all the "respectable" magazines, with a few sterling exceptions, such as Foreign Policy magazine, two distinguished scholars were smeared as bigots and worse. John Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of political science at the University of Chicago and is well-known as the dean of the American "realists" and the author of The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, whose reputation as a serious scholar has never been questioned – until now. Stephen Walt was the dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, and his academic credentials, too, have been considered nothing less than sterling – until now.

Professor Mearsheimer, whose pieces used to appear on the op-ed page of the New York Times with some regularity, has since been banished from that prestigious forum: not a single one of his articles has appeared in their pages since the publication of The Israel Lobby.

Walt, too, has been blacklisted. As the writer Philip Weiss related: "A year or so back, Walt said to me that when he took the Israel lobby project on, he forswore high government service; he realized it would be out of reach for him if he attacked this issue." Also, as Weiss points out, he "was biting the hand that feeds him, literally. His chair at Harvard is funded by Robert and Renee Belfer, who according to GuideStar.org are trustees of the right-wing Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a think tank Walt attacked in his paper."

Originally published in a shorter version by Harvard and put on the Kennedy School's Web site, "The Israel Lobby" paper was stripped of its Harvard logo at the insistence of Alan Dershowitz and others. The call to de-fund Walt's academic position went out. Weiss also relates that Walt "suffered some degree of social ostracism in Cambridge." And a campaign to censor the authors was launched: their invitation to speak before the Chicago Council for Global Affairs was rescinded at the last minute: their subject was "too hot to handle." In a letter to the Council board of directors, Mearsheimer and Walt relate the following:

"Council President Marshall Bouton phoned one of us (Mearsheimer) and informed him that he was canceling the event. He said he felt 'extremely uncomfortable making this call' and that his decision did not reflect his personal views on the subject of our book. Instead, he explained that his decision was based on the need 'to protect the institution.' He said that he had a serious 'political problem,' because there were individuals who would be angry if he gave us a venue to speak, and that this would have serious negative consequences for the Council. 'This one is so hot,' Marshall maintained, that he could not present it at a Council session unless someone from 'the other side' – such as Abraham Foxman of the Anti-Defamation League – was on stage with us. At the very least, he needed to present 'contending viewpoints.' But he said it was too late to try to change the format, as the fall schedule was being finalized and there would not be sufficient time to arrange an alternate date. He showed little interest in doing anything with us in 2008 or beyond."

The argument made by the Lobby was that Mearsheimer and Walt were presenting views that could not be aired without an appropriate counterpoint: that if they were allowed to speak, Abe Foxman must be there, on hand to refute what can only be characterized, under the circumstances, as dangerous and even evil ideas. In other words, the authors of The Israel Lobby are purveyors of poison, and so we must have the antidote ready and in reach.

I want to emphasize that all this brouhaha over The Israel Lobby occurred before the book was even out. Prior to publication day, the Center for the Humanities at the Graduate Center at the City University of New York, a Jewish cultural center in Washington, and three organizations in Chicago had all canceled events at which the authors were scheduled to speak.

The irony is that this illustrates, in rather vivid terms, a central thesis of the book. As Mearsheimer and Walt put it:

"The Lobby doesn't want an open debate, of course, because that might lead Americans to question the level of support they provide. Accordingly, pro-Israel organizations work hard to influence the institutions that do most to shape popular opinion."

When the book was finally released, the "hot" polemic everyone had anticipated was nowhere to be seen. Instead, The Israel Lobby turned out to be a cool, dispassionate look at the structure, identity, motivation, and machinations of the pro-Israel forces in this country, and specifically their power and influence within the Washington Beltway and over the three main levers of power: Congress, the executive, and the media. Written in the style of a disinterested observer, the prose is dull, almost plodding, as the authors relate, in excruciating detail, how the Lobby has distorted both the policymaking process and also the debate around these issues insofar as they impact the Middle East.

The Lobby's agenda is not only to secure more aid – both military and economic – than any other recipient of American largesse, but also to use American military power to reshape the Middle East to Israel's advantage: in Lebanon, where Hezbollah threatens Israeli security, to Syria, backer of Palestinian resistance groups, to Iraq – where Saddam Hussein once offered to pay compensation to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers – to Iran, now the Lobby's main target, where the drive to acquire nuclear power has been declared an "existential threat" by Israeli leaders. Central to this agenda is the undermining of America's role as an honest Middle East peace broker when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

As Mearsheimer and Walt relate in detail, the Lobby has fought relentlessly against the establishment of a Palestinian state and against the very idea of a more balanced treatment of the issue in American policymaking circles. This has been the case ever since Bush the first caved on the question of Israeli settlements in Palestine, and when Bill Clinton took office, things got worse.

The Clinton administration sided with Israel all during the Camp David process, letting the Israelis see documents and edit them before they were available to the Palestinians. Clinton also kept the Arab states away from Camp David and assembled a team bereft of anyone with expertise in Arab politics. President Clinton took daily calls from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and his chief negotiator, Dennis Ross, was and is a partisan of Israel. In the end, Clinton had the chutzpah to blame Arafat, of all people, for the failure of the peace process.

In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration made an initial attempt to pressure Israel to pull in its expansionist policies. For the first time, George W. Bush advocated a separate Palestinian state. The Bush people put what the New York Times characterized as "enormous pressure" on Ariel Sharon and the Israeli government to make some sort of accommodation with the Palestinians.

The Israelis were in a panic: Sharon denounced U.S. efforts as an attempt to "appease the Arabs at our expense," likened Bush to Neville Chamberlain, and declared "We will not be Czechoslovakia!" It wasn't long before Israeli tanks were barreling into Hebron.

In response to the Bush administration's post-9/11 initiatives in the Middle East, Israel launched a full-scale campaign to delegitimize Yasser Arafat, the elected leader of the Palestinians, and isolate the PLO and the Palestinian people. Israel and its American lobby made a concerted effort to equate Arafat with Osama bin Laden – and, furthermore, to convince Americans that the Israelis were engaged in a fight against terrorism similar to that in which the U.S. was engaged with al-Qaeda. The equation of al-Qaeda with the Palestinians did not quite fit, but the propaganda offensive was on full throttle. An open letter from the Project for a New American Century, signed by prominent neoconservatives such as Norman Podhoretz, Charles Krauthammer, and Richard Perle, called on Bush to "fully support our fellow democracy," Israel, and demanded an end to all support for the Palestinians. An effort in Congress to cut Bush off at the pass was successful: in November, 89 senators sent a letter to the president hailing his decision not to meet with Arafat and demanding that the U.S. refrain from putting pressure on Israel not to launch fresh attacks on the Palestinian territories.

By late in the month, the administration had come around to the Lobby's point of view. When the Israelis attacked Palestinian positions in the Gaza strip, the U.S. said nothing. Sharon was visiting Bush at the time, and the meeting was friendly. No mention was made of U.S.-Israeli tensions, which had magically disappeared. The Israel lobby had chalked up a victory. The Karina A incident, in which a ship loaded down with Iranian arms was captured in the Red Sea, convinced Bush that the Palestinians were rearming with Iran's help. This, in spite of the fact that the ultimate destination of the ship was in dispute: it's likely the arms were headed to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Regardless of the truth of the matter, the Israelis won the day in Washington – and the Palestinians were once again isolated diplomatically. The American effort to engage with Arafat and restart the peace process was indefinitely stalled.

This did not put an end to the ongoing U.S.-Israeli contretemps. By late March, the Israelis were at it again: in response to a Hamas suicide bomber who killed 30 Israelis at a Passover Seder, they launched Operation Defensive Shield and took control of the occupied territories. The U.S. demanded Israeli withdrawal – and the Israel lobby went into action.

Their target was Colin Powell, then secretary of state, who was on a trip to the Middle East that included a visit with Arafat. Neoconservatives in the White House and the Pentagon went into action, determined to sabotage Powell's efforts. The neoconservative media started attacking Powell: David Brooks on the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, Bill Kristol in the Weekly Standard, and the entire stable of neoconservative newspaper columnists went ballistic. Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who had made a special trip to America to make the case for Israel, announced that the Powell trip would not amount to a hill of beans. Powell, under constant pressure from the Lobby and its supporters, later described his trip as "ten of the most miserable days of my life." In the end, Powell was neutralized, and his efforts came to naught.

The other target of the Lobby's campaign was the president himself. Top Republican congressional leaders were mobilized: Tom DeLay, Trent Lott, and Dick Armey visited Bush in the White House and told him to lay off Israel. This was followed by the Christian evangelicals, led by Jerry Falwell, who organized a massive phone campaign in support of Israel: Washington was deluged with calls, e-mails, letters, and faxes.

It worked.

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Bush caved. Shortly after the Lobby launched its campaign against the White House, Bush spokesman Ari Fleischer announced that the president believed Sharon was "a man of peace" – this, as Powell returned to Washington in defeat and the IDF continued to occupy Palestinian lands, in defiance of Washington.

The Lobby kept up the pressure on Bush, relentlessly pushing Congress and mobilizing its supporters in the streets. A huge rally was held in Washington: Netanyahu, Republican congressional leaders, House Minority leader Dick Gephardt, and Paul Wolfowitz spoke. The latter was booed when he dared mention the suffering of the Palestinians. Netanyahu made a well-publicized visit to Congress in mid-April, where he met with 40 senators and lobbied them to override the administration's objections and pass a resolution in support of the Israelis. Arafat was condemned, "solidarity with Israel" reasserted, and a congressional delegation on a visit to Israel held a press conference and asked Bush to stop pressuring the Israelis to negotiate with Arafat. The coup de grace was delivered by the House appropriations committee, which was considering an extra $200 million for Israel in order to fight terrorism. Bush tried to stop it and Powell took the lead in opposing it, but to no avail: it passed overwhelmingly, and a reluctant Bush signed the bill.

What had happened was that the Israelis had outflanked the White House and established effective veto power over U.S. policy in the Middle East. The president's capitulation was complete. In the summer of 2002, Bush gave a speech on the Middle East in which he called for new Palestinian leadership: Arafat, he strongly implied, had to go. The Israelis were jubilant. Their longtime effort to isolate and neutralize the non-Islamist leadership of the Palestinians had succeeded at last.

However, the second point of Bush's speech was not so pleasing to the Israelis: the president called for the creation of a Palestinian state by 2005. The "Road Map" was born. Mahmoud Abbas replaced Arafat, who stepped aside, and the so-called Quartet released the details of the plan just as the U.S. invasion of Iraq was taking place.

The Israelis, for their part, kept a low profile vis-à-vis the Road Map. Bush was at the height of his popularity: the postwar problems of Iraq had yet to manifest themselves, and support for his policies was at an all-time high. Rather than strike, the Lobby watched and waited. While Sharon made friendly noises about the Road Map and claimed he was ready to move on it, in private his advisers were criticizing it, and Sharon himself told his cabinet the president's peace plan was "irrelevant." Settlement activity continued, as did the gradual annexation of the West Bank.

Sharon said nothing in public, but the Lobby sure did. Both Abe Foxman and Malcolm Hoenlein expressed reservations about the plan at a meeting with Condoleezza Rice, and AIPAC – the Lobby's premier action group – authored a letter to the president, signed by the usual congressional amen corner, that asked him not to put pressure on Israel to go along with the Road Map and demanded that the Palestinians move against the militants before Israel would be forced to make a single concession.

AIPAC and the other pro-Israel lobbying groups did not actively oppose the Road Map at this point, but neither did they support it. This left the field open to the anti-Road Map crowd. And it just so happened that the Israelis chose this moment to renew their campaign of targeted assassinations, although Sharon had promised Powell that this would end. The day after Hamas expressed interest in a cease-fire, Israel tried but failed to kill Hamas leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi. Clearly, Sharon was trying to torpedo the Road Map.

When Bush offered some mild criticism of these actions, the Lobby struck back. Tom DeLay threatened to sponsor a congressional resolution offering, in effect, unconditional support to the Israelis, over the president's head. Bush met with a number of the Lobby's leaders on June 11, and the next day the White House was completely turned around. Israel was once again supported, no matter what. The issue, said White House spokesman Ari Fleischer, wasn't Israel, it wasn't Sharon – it's the "terrorists" who were trying to stop the peace process from moving forward.

Once again, Bush was put in his place by the Lobby.

Another flare-up occurred with the so-called "security fence" started by the Israelis in 2003 – ostensibly to protect its citizens against terrorist acts, but in reality to create a situation on the ground where Israeli expansionism was made irreversible, peace process or no peace process. Bush expressed his displeasure at a joint press conference with Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas, saying that the wall would be a "problem" and an obstacle to the peace process. A few days later, however, standing with Sharon at the White House, the president said nothing as the Israeli prime minister declared that he would do his best to minimize the problems created by the wall for the Palestinians. However, Secretary Powell made the point that the wall looked rather like an attempt to steal yet more Palestinian land, and Condi Rice chimed in with the idea that the U.S. should deduct the cost of the wall from $9 billion in loan guarantees Congress had already voted for Israel. The whole brouhaha wound up costing the Israelis some $4 million – a drop in the bucket in the context of the billions spent each year on U.S. aid to Israel.

When the Israelis started making noises about expelling Arafat from the West Bank and forcing him into exile, the Americans said this would be "unacceptable" – and the Israelis backed down. But these two minor victories were but a prelude to the main battle over the Road Map, which Sharon was determined to destroy with his policy of "unilateral disengagement." What this meant, it turned out, was an imposed "settlement" that gave the Palestinians Gaza and much less than they were entitled to on the West Bank. There would be no Palestinian state: Sharon's chief adviser declared that the Israelis wanted to "freeze the process."

George W. Bush did not utter a peep of protest. Instead, he described Sharon's action as "a bold courageous step," and, on April 14, announced that U.S. policy had changed: instead of returning most or even a good deal of the occupied territories and letting Palestinian refugees return to their homes, Israel would be allowed to maintain the status quo. In the meantime, the Israelis continued to build new settlements and expand old ones, while their campaign of targeted assassinations scotched any attempt to reignite the peace process.

The death of Arafat and the election of Abbas as the new Palestinian leader did little to change the situation. Bush was already committed to Sharon's unilateral plan, and the plan for a Palestinian state was effectively doomed even as a breath of democracy swept through the Holy Land. Sharon refused to negotiate with Abbas, and the lack of American support effectively undercut the Palestinian leader's position. This led to the triumph of Hamas in the Palestinian parliamentary elections. It looked like Sharon, as the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz put it, was the campaign manager for Hamas. As Hamas emerged victorious, Sharon didn't have to even keep up the pretense of being interested in negotiating: his flat-out refusal appeared reasonable.

The Israeli strategy of "unilateral disengagement" imploded when the Palestinians continued rocket attacks and in June '05 captured an Israeli soldier. The failure of disengagement was underscored by the second Lebanese war, when Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who had by then taken the place of the incapacitated Sharon, discovered that there was and is no way to seal off the Israelis from their Palestinian problem.

At the tail end of 2006, Condoleezza Rice initiated an effort to restart the peace process. This occurred in tandem with the revival of the Arab League's 2002 proposal, pushed by the Saudis, which envisioned a comprehensive settlement of the Palestinian issue: all 22 members of the Arab League would make peace with Israel and establish formal relations. In return, Israel would return to the 1967 borders, return the Golan Heights, and negotiate a "just solution" to the Palestinian refugee problem.

The Saudis were getting nervous about Iran, which had been unleashed in Iraq by the American invasion. They were eager to contain Tehran, which was gaining influence with some Palestinian factions. The Israelis, however, were not interested. Neither, it seems, were the Americans, who did nothing to push the Israelis to compromise. Rice's trip to Jerusalem was an embarrassing failure: neither Olmert nor Abbas would appear at a joint press conference with her. A return trip, in March 2007, was also a flop. Any negotiations would end in Israel giving up most of the West Bank – and that, above all, is what the current Israeli government does not want. That's why they won't negotiate with the moderates – such as Abbas – who have shown a genuine desire for peace. Why should they want peace, when war has served them so well?

Another obstacle to peace, aside from the intransigence of the Israeli government, is the hard-line stance of the Israel lobby in this country. Whenever the prospect of peace raises its ugly head, there they are to cut it off. The neoconservatives inside the administration – notably Elliott Abrams, John Hannah, and David Wurmser – have actively undermined the least movement in the direction of a political settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Abrams is very close to two of Olmert's top aides: Yalom Turbowitz, Olmert's chief of staff, and Shalom Turgeman, Olmert's chief diplomat. As Daniel Levy, a former adviser in the prime minister's office, points out, "If Rice is getting too active with her peacemaking quest, then T + T can always be dispatched to Elliott Abrams at the White House, who in turn will enlist Cheney to keep the president in tow."

Rice and the State Department have been effectively marginalized in this administration, and this is especially true when it comes to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, just as Mahmoud Abbas has been marginalized in the occupied territories, where he continues to suffer from the lack of any real prospect for a Palestinian state.

It is hardly in America's national interest to continue this state of affairs. We are up against a terrorist enemy that uses our unconditional support of Israel as one of its main recruiting devices – second only to the war in Iraq. America's Israeli-centric policy in the Middle East reinforces al-Qaeda's contention that the U.S. is out to destroy Islam, humiliate the Arab people, and impose what it calls "Crusader-Zionist" hegemony on the region. Our policy destabilizes the Arab governments in the region who are our allies, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and the current government of Lebanon. It in no way serves our purposes to have this open sore continue to fester. And yet every attempt to heal this wound has been met with opposition from the powerful pro-Israel lobby in our midst, and the poisons issuing forth from this wound continue to infect the whole region, including Iraq.

The U.S. – which has no compunction about pressuring client countries to toe the line – has not done so with Israel. Quite the opposite: it is the U.S. that has toed the Israeli line, and that is due entirely to the power of the Israeli lobby – in Congress, in the political parties, in the Washington think tanks, and in the media. I have taken the example of the Palestinian problem as an example of how the Israel lobby distorts American foreign policy and turns the policymaking process against the very purposes it was meant to accomplish – advancing the national interest. Yet this distortion takes places on a much wider scale, not just in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, but also when it came to the Iraq war, our policy toward Iran, our relations with Syria, and virtually every issue of consequence in the region.

~ Justin Raimondo

http://www.antiwar.com/